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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
HERBERT BUTLER, #97-B-2604,
Petitioner,
       
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #16-1-2010-0158.29
INDEX # 2010-429
-against- ORI #NY016015J




This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Herbert Butler, verified on March 22, 2010 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on March 29, 2010. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Wallkill Correctional Facility, is challenging the March/April 2009 determination denying
him parole and directing he be held for an additional 24 months.  The Court issued an
Order to Show Cause on April 1, 2010 and has received and reviewed respondent’s
Answer, including Confidential Exhibits B and D, verified on May 20, 2010.  The Court
has also received and reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto, filed in the Franklin County
Clerk’s office on June 8, 2010.
On November 26, 1997 petitioner was sentenced in Onondaga County Court to a
controlling indeterminate sentence of 12½ to 25 years upon his convictions of the crimes
of Robbery 1°, Assault 2° and Grand Larceny 4°.  On December 23, 1997 he was sentenced
in that court to an additional concurrent indeterminate sentence of 12½ to 25 years upon
another conviction of the crime of Robbery 1°.  Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on
1 of 5 
[* 1]
direct appeal to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department.  People v. Butler, 269 AD2d
807, lv den 95 NY2d 794 and People v. Butler, 269 AD2d 884, lv den 95 NY2d 794.  
Petitioner made his initial appearance before a Parole Board on March 31, 2009. 
Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying him parole and directing that
he be held for an additional 24 months.  All three parole commissioners concurred in the
denial determination which reads as follows: 
“PAROLE IS DENIED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: AFTER A
CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD AND THIS INTERVIEW, IT IS
THE DETERMINATION OF THIS PANEL THAT IF RELEASE AT THIS
TIME THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD
NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW
AND YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
WELFARE AND SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY.  THIS DECISION IS
BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: THE SERIOUS BRUTAL
NATURE OF THE INSTANT OFFENSE ROBBERY 1ST (2 CTS) AND
ASSAULT 2ND INVOLVED YOU ACTING INCONCERT ARMED WITH
WEAPONS ENTERING A RESTAURANT ORDERING VICTIMS TO LAY
ON THE FLOOR, STRIKING ANOTHER VICTIM WITH A BASEBALL BAT
CAUSING PHYSICAL INJURY AND FORCIBLY REMOVING U.S.
CURRENCY.  IN A SEPARATE INCIDENT YOU AGAIN ACTING
INCONCERT DID FORCIBLY REMOVE U. S. CURRENCY FROM
ANOTHER PREMISE [sic]. THIS IS CLEARLY AN ESCALATION OF
YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY.  NOTE IS MADE OF YOUR POSITIVE
PROGRAMING.  HOWEVER, YOUR REPEATED ACTS OF CRIMINALITY
AND YOUR UNWILLINGNESS TO OBEY FACILITY RULES LEADS THIS
PANEL TO DETERMINE THAT YOUR RELEASE TO A COMMUNITY IS
INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.” 
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the parole denial
determination was received by the Division of Parole Appeals Unit on August 28, 2009.
The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue it’s findings and recommendation within the
four-month time frame specified in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c).  This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary
release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
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probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.  In
making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered:  (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . .[and] (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
to the inmate . . .” In addition to the above, where the minimum period of imprisonment
was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the
seriousness of the underlying offense and the inmate’s prior criminal record. See
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a).  
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be
judicial functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law
§259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26
AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051.  Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
A significant portion of the petition is focused, in one way or another, on the
assertion that the parole denial determination was improperly based solely on the nature
and severity of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration, without adequate
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consideration of other statutory factors.  A parole board, however, need not assign equal
weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a discretionary
parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its
written decision.  See Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter
v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v. Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713.  As
noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole
denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the
relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and
rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the
record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not
required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole
as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.  Comfort v. New York State Division of
Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).  
A  review of the Inmate Status Report and the transcript of the parole hearing
reveals that the Board had before it, and considered, the appropriate statutory factors
including petitioner’s programming and vocational achievements,  disciplinary record
(four Tier III’s and two Tier II’s)  and release plans, as well as the circumstances of the
crimes underlying his incarceration and limited prior criminal record.  See Zhang v.
Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  The petitioner was also afforded an opportunity at the parole
hearing to make his own statement to the presiding commissioners.  In view of the
foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board failed to consider the
relevant statutory factors.  See Pearl v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 
and  Zhang v. Travis, 10  AD3d  828.  In addition, under the facts and circumstances of
this case the Court finds no basis to conclude that the parole denial determination
usurped the authority of the judiciary by effectively resentencing  petitioner for his crimes. 
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 See Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, Smith v. New York
State Division of Parole, 64 AD3d 1030 and Marsh v. New York State Division of Parole,
31 AD3d 818. 
Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature
of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration.  See Champion v. Dennison, 40 AD3d
1181, lv dis 9 NY3d 913, Valerio v. Dennison, 35 AD3d 938, McCorkle v. New York State
Division of Parole, 24 AD3d 926, Larmon v. Travis, 14 AD3d 960 and Zhang v. Travis,
10 AD3d 828.
Petitioner also argues that the 24-month hold imposed by the Board was excessive. 
The Court disagrees.  “The scheduling of the reconsideration hearing was a matter for the
Board to determine the exercise of its discretion . . . subject to the statutory 24-month
maximum.”   Tatta v. State of New York, Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907, 908, lv den
98 NY2d 604 (citations omitted).  The Court finds the 24-month hold is not excessive nor
improper under the circumstances of this case.  See Lue-Shing v. Travis, 12 AD3d 802,
lv den 4 NY3d 705 and Tatta v. State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907, lv
den 98 NY2d 604.   
 Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.      
Dated: August 18, 2010 at 
Indian Lake, New York.        __________________________
                                                                                        S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice
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